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The elimination of nuclear weapons has been an UN objective since 1946. Though 
addressed through multiple forums, including the UNGA First Committee, 
Conference on Disarmament, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
possession and renunciation of nuclear weapons nevertheless remains a topic beset 
by multilateral stalemate and frustration over the entrenchment of positions 
between nuclear- and non-nuclear weapon states. And yet, within these forums, 
disarmament politics is taking a new turn with the emergence of new, cross-
regional, cross-factional political groups working alongside more established blocs. 
Focusing on these group dynamics, this article argues that the emergence of new 
political groups, and their interplay with others, is critical to the effective 
functioning of disarmament negotiations moving forward. Through means of 
cooperative information exchange, encouraging policy-entrepreneurship, and by 
challenging the rigidity of entrenched bloc positioning, these new group dynamics 
may make an important contribution in the search for consensus within the UN.  
 




“When states parties to a treaty like the NPT meet to deliberate its future—and 
when they are obliged to reach decisions about the future of that treaty under the 
pressure of time—the importance of group dynamics becomes all the more 
apparent and undeniable.” 
Jayantha Dhanapala 
President of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference1 
 
In 1946 the very first resolution passed by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) established a 
Commission to deal with problems related to the discovery of atomic energy and to make 
proposals for, ‘the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other 
major weapons adaptable to mass destruction’.2  Today, the possession and renunciation of 
nuclear weapons continues to present a central topic of consideration for the UN, being 
addressed through multiple forums including the UNGA First Committee, the UN 
                                                 
1 Jayantha Dhanapala & Randy Rydell, Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider’s Account (UN 
Institute for Disarmament Research, 2005), p.30 
2 UN General Assembly, ‘Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery 
of Atomic Energy’ A/RES/1(I) (1946) 
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Disarmament Commission (UNDC), the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with its quinquennial review conferences (RevCon).3  
 
Whilst a seemingly impressive institutional response by the UN in providing multiple 
forums for its members to debate and negotiate a world free of nuclear weapons, what these 
numerous forums also showcase is that, since 1946, the UN has had its hands tied in terms 
of achieving nuclear disarmament, requiring it to seek an agreement through various treaty-
based and organisational structures, none of which have been effective in providing a 
multilateral solution. These forums are beset by numerous challenges, not least that UN 
disarmament politics has been characterised by a fundamental divide between the world’s 
nuclear ‘haves’ – namely the five UN-recognised nuclear weapon states (NWS) – and 
‘have-nots’, the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).4 Work has thus been marred by 
multilateral stalemate, increasing frustrations, and heightened uncertainty.5  
 
Within these forums however, a new dynamic is starting to emerge. As Jayantha Dhanapala 
highlights in the introductory quote to this article, the importance of group dynamics within 
forums like the NPT are both increasingly apparent and undeniable. Within UN 
disarmament negotiations individual state preferences, whilst regularly vocalised through 
formal statements or the submission of working papers, have since the late 1990s and early 
2000s been far more frequently represented by a handful of prominent political groups, most 
notably including the Permanent-Five (P-5), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the New 
Agenda Coalition (NAC), and a number of other important, if perhaps less high-profile, 
political groupings such as the European Union (EU)6 and the League of Arab States. Since 
                                                 
3 In October 2012 the UNGA also established an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Taking Forward 
Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations. This was a largely ad hoc body that met between March and 
April 2013 and then reported to the UNGA and CD. A further OEWG was announced following the 
conclusion of the 70th session of the UNGA First Committee in October 2015, see UN Resolution ‘Taking 
forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations’, A/C.1/70/L.13/Rev.1, 29 October 2015. Space 
constraints sadly prevent discussion of these OEWG, as well as other ad hoc debates such as UNGA Special 
Sessions devoted to disarmament. 
4 Christian Mölling, ‘The grand bargain in the NPT: challenges for the EU beyond 2010’ in Jean Pascal 
Zanders (eds.) Nuclear Weapons After the 2010 NPT Review Conference, EU Institute for Security Studies, 
Chaillot Papers (2010), pp. 49-70 
5 For example, see Reaching Critical Will, First Committee Briefing Book, (New York), 2015, p.4; UN News 
Centre, ‘Consensus Eludes Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference as Positions Harden on Ways 
to Free Middle East of Mass Destruction Weapons’, 22 May 2015; UN News Centre, ‘General Assembly 
President encourages disarmament meeting to stay focused’, 3 March 2014 
6 Whilst the P-5 and NAM have been active in UN disarmament negotiations prior to the 1990s, the EU first 
began to present a common position, particularly within the NPT, following the signing of the Treaty on 
European Union in 1992. The NAC was formed in 2000. 
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2010, the importance of group dynamics within UN disarmament forums has become even 
more apparent. This upturn in group dynamics has emerged as a direct result of the creation 
of several new political groupings, including the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
Initiative (NPDI), made up of twelve middle-ground and umbrella NNWS, promoting 
bridge-building language between diverging nuclear interests, and the Group of Sixteen 
(G16), made up of sixteen NNWS promoting what has become known as the Humanitarian 
Impact of Nuclear Weapons (HINW) or ‘Humanitarian Initiative’.7  
 
As this article shall argue, these new group dynamics, and their interplay with other 
established political groups, are indicative of a growing effort by states to overcome the 
stalemate of UN disarmament politics by searching for a new consensus within the global 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. Through cooperative group interplay these new groups 
have not only promoted better information exchange and the fostering of dialogue between 
more entrenched group positions, but have encouraged a proactive agenda through policy-
entrepreneurship; further challenging the rigidity and conservatism of established bloc 
formations.   
 
To present this case, and in keeping with the analytical framework detailed in the 
introduction to this special issue on the Multilateral Politics of UN Diplomacy, this article 
focuses on two critical research questions: First, how do states explicitly interact through 
groups within UN disarmament forums? And second, what difference do these group 
dynamics and interplay make to consensus-building in the case of UN disarmament politics? 
This article draws on the literature on multilateral diplomacy and negotiation theory, and 
presents empirical research covering the period 2005 to 2015. It is presented in four main 
sections. Section one gives a brief introduction to the established groups within the UN’s 
numerous disarmament forums, the challenges they face, and the contribution that 
multilateral diplomacy and negotiation theory can make to understanding group politics at 
play in these forums. In section two, attention turns to the new group dynamics that have 
emerged in these forums since 2010, with particular focus given to why and how these 
groups were formed and the tactics they have employed in the search for consensus within 
the specific context of the NPT 2010-2015 review cycle. Section three considers the 
                                                 
7 B. Tertrais ‘The “humanitarian dimension” of nuclear disarmament: a legitimate debate?’ Fondation pour la 
Recerche Strategique, note no. 12. 2015 
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influence of these new group dynamics and what this may mean for UN disarmament 
politics in the future.  The fourth section concludes. 
 
The empirical data presented in this article is drawn from documentary analysis of state and 
group statements and working papers, NGO commentary, and UN press releases, along with 
interview data obtained by the author during two rounds of fieldwork undertaken in 
Brussels, New York and Geneva, between March and June 2011, and November 2014 and 
June 2015. Thirty-five semi-structured elite interviews were conducted in total over this 
period.  Face to face and telephone interviews were conducted with officials at the level of 
Ambassador, Deputy Ambassador, First Secretary or Counsellor, on a non-attributable basis, 
and with all interviewees having first-hand experience of working within one, several, or all 
of the UN’s disarmament forums, including those able to speak to closed room negotiations 
which are otherwise undocumented. Interviews were sought from a representative sample of 
the complete regional and political spread of views held within UN disarmament 
negotiations, and, most pertinently, those states involved in one or more political group, 
including members of the newly formed NPDI and G16.  As agreed all interviewees have 
their anonymity preserved. 
 The UN’s disarmament politics: processes and challenges 
In previous decades, states have worked predominantly through a number of formalised 
regional and political groups within UN disarmament negotiations. As defined in the 
introduction to this special issue,8 regional groups are those five ‘official’ UN blocs such as 
the Western European and Other Group (WEOG), from which states are appointed to 
preside over positions within the numerous disarmament forums.  In addition to the loose 
coordination and membership of states within these official regional blocs, states have also 
long been active within other typically smaller, yet often far more prominent, political 
groupings. Within UN disarmament forums there are a number of active formal political 
groups representing the main bloc-formations of state preferences on the issue of nuclear 
disarmament. These include most notably the P-5 representing the collective views of the 
five UN-recognised NWS, the NAM9 representing over 100 non-Western, developing, 
NNWS seeking the immediate elimination of nuclear weapons by the P-5, the NAC 
                                                 
8 Karen E. Smith & Katie Laatikainen, ‘The Multilateral Politics of UN Diplomacy: Introduction’ (this 
volume) 
9 For an interesting study on the functioning and politics of the NAM as a political group see Gaukhar 
Mukhatzhanova & William Potter Nuclear Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement (The Adelphi series, 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012) 
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representing six prominent NNWS middle powers strongly in favour of nuclear 
disarmament,10 and, with varying levels of proactivity, the EU11 and League of Arab States12 
each representing the common regional positions of their members. 
 
Important to recognise however, is that there is no one main forum for addressing the 
elimination of nuclear weapons by the UN. Instead the UN today is home to numerous 
venues for debate and negotiation centred upon the basic remit of nuclear disarmament,13 
within which political groups loosely arrange themselves. Of particular relevance is the NPT 
which is widely recognised as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. The NPT was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. Its objectives were 
threefold.  First, it enshrined the commitment by the P-5 to ‘pursue negotiations in good 
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and 
to nuclear disarmament’.14 Second, it committed its majority NNWS to abstain from 
obtaining nuclear weapons or weapons technology and to accept safeguard and verification 
measures as set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency.  And third, it established 
the commitment by all states parties to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  Now 
with 190 states parties, the NPT today not only commits a total 185 states to the objective of 
nuclear non-proliferation, but is also the only international treaty in which the P-5 commit to 
the goal of general and complete nuclear disarmament. 
 
The NPT is reviewed every five years in quinquennial review cycles including three 
Preparatory Committees (PrepCom) – held between New York and Geneva over three 
consecutive years, and culminating in a fifth year Review Conference (RevCon) which is 
held in New York over four weeks from April to May.  NPT RevCons have a dual purpose: 
to review the previous five years of the Treaty’s operation to consider its implementation 
and oversight, and to address the Treaty’s forward momentum in agreeing points of action 
for the fulfilment of all states’ obligations under the Treaty.  
                                                 
10 Formed in 2000 and now comprised of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa. 
11 For an overview see Megan Dee, ‘The EU’s performance in the NPT review negotiations: Consistency, 
Change, Challenges’ in D. Bourantonis, S. Blavoukos and C. Portela (eds.) The EU and the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons: Strategies, Policies, Actions. (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 2015) 
12 The League of Arab States tends to have a variable presence in these forums but is a prominent group when 
it comes to discussions over the proposed Middle East WMD Free Zone 
13 Space constraints prevent discussion of other UN arms control forums which seek to limit the spread, or 
total elimination, of other weapons of mass destruction including biological, chemical weapons, missiles, and 
conventional arms, see: <http://www.un.org/disarmament/HomePage/Issues/>.  




The NPT RevCon is however a treaty-based negotiating forum underwritten by a Grand 
Bargain: the vast majority of its signatories commit not to develop nuclear weapons, 
provided that the P-5 take practical steps towards the general and complete disarmament of 
their own recognised nuclear weapons programmes.15 A general contention nevertheless 
pervades NPT negotiations.  Whilst the Grand Bargain implies equity across each of the 
NPT’s three pillars,16 there is a marked imbalance in the NPT’s negotiations which places 
far greater emphasis upon NNWS upholding their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, 
than upon the NWS and their obligation to disarm. An underlying discrimination and 
inequality is therefore understood to exist between the nuclear and non-nuclear weapon 
states,17 most commonly centred upon the frustrations of NNWS over perceived failures of 
the P-5 to live up to their obligations to implement past RevCon decisions,18 or to take steps 
towards their nuclear disarmament.  
 
Further supplementing the work of the NPT, and mirroring many of the same inherent 
challenges, is the UNGA First Committee. Meeting in session for four weeks every October 
to November, the First Committee considers and adopts resolutions and decisions on a range 
of issues from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction to conventional arms, regional 
measures and disarmament machinery. Unlike the NPT, which makes decisions by 
consensus, the First Committee makes decisions based on one member, one vote, with 
voting often divided along ‘official’ UN group lines; although the P-5, NAM and NAC 
remain active as political groups within this forum. Whilst the First Committee does offer 
the NNWS some notable advantages due to sheer weight of numbers relative to the NWS, it 
is noted that consensus is also regularly sought for many resolutions adopted, particularly 
when they relate to the progress of multilateral disarmament negotiations.19  The First 
                                                 
15 Mölling, ‘The grand bargain in the NPT’ 
16 Mölling ‘The grand bargain in the NPT’, p.49 
17 Harold Müller ‘A treaty in troubled waters: Reflections on the failed NPT review conference', The 
International Spectator, 40(3), 33 — 44, 2005, p.38, J. Ruzicka and N. Wheeler, ‘The puzzle of trusting 
relationships in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty’. International Affairs, 86(1), 69–85. 2010, p.75 
18 Reaching Critical Will, The NPT Action Plan Monitoring Report, March 2015; Megan Dee, ‘The EU's 
multilateralist combat against the proliferation of WMD in the NPT: mirroring the Grand Bargain’, European 
Security, 24(1), 1-20, 2015. 
19 i.e. UN Resolution, ‘Revitalising the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward 
multilateral disarmament negotiations’, A/C.1/66/L.39. 2011 
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Committee has often been criticised for its failure to make any substantive progress and, 
thus, of contributing to the dysfunction of UN multilateral disarmament efforts.20 
 
The First Committee works in close collaboration with the UN Disarmament Commission 
(UNDC), established in 1952. The UNDC is a subsidiary body of the UNGA and is 
composed of all UNGA members. It was created as a largely deliberative body with the 
purpose of considering and making recommendations on issues in the field of disarmament.  
Whilst the UNDC has in past years formulated consensus-based principles and 
recommendations for the First Committee, over the last decade it also has not agreed any 
substantive outcome.21  
 
Further working alongside the NPT, First Committee, and UNDC is the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD). The CD was established in 1979 as the world's only permanent 
multilateral disarmament treaty negotiating body. Based in Geneva, the CD differs from the 
UNDC in that it is intended as a negotiation, rather than debating and advisory, forum. It 
also differs from the First Committee in that its focus is explicitly on the cessation of the 
nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as opposed to the First Committee’s broader 
remit of international security and disarmament. Furthermore, in contrast to the NPT, the 
CD includes India, Pakistan, Israel and the DPRK amongst its sixty-five members. Its 
negotiation remit thus spans not only the objective of nuclear disarmament amongst the P-5, 
but crucially also those non-NPT states parties who possess nuclear weapons but who go 
unrecognised by the UN Security Council.  
 
The CD differs moreover from the UN’s other disarmament forums in that, whilst the P-5, 
NAC, and EU do loosely coordinate in preparation for CD sessions,22 CD members form 
into four main regional groups for the purposes of negotiations: the Western Group, the 
(NAM) Group of 21, the Eastern European Group, and the Group of One (China). In further 
contrast to the First Committee and UNDC, the CD meets in annual session, divided into 
three parts, meeting for ten weeks from January, seven weeks from May, and seven weeks 
from July. Despite having more time for negotiations, the CD nevertheless mirrors the NPT 
                                                 
20 UN Meetings Coverage, ‘Anxiety over Nuclear Weapons ‘Deep and Genuine’, 8 October 2015; Benjamin 
Seel, ‘Frustration Evident in UN First Committee’ Arms Control  
Today, 2 December 2011 
21 UN Meetings Coverage, ‘Disarmament Commission, Concluding 2015 Session, Urged Not to Lose Faith’, 
24 April 2015 
22 Interviews, June 2015 
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in that it too faces the challenge of decision-making on the basis of the consensus rule 
whereby all sixty-five members must consent before a decision may be adopted. The CD 
has subsequently been hamstrung for the past two decades, rarely able to negotiate a 
substantive work programme, let alone a genuine consensus-based disarmament 
agreement.23  
 
As this discussion has demonstrated, multilateral stalemate besets the UN’s numerous 
disarmament forums.  Negotiators must manoeuvre not only intense power politics between 
the NWS, but also between an increasingly frustrated majority of NNWS who in turn align 
with various political groups reflecting a diverse mixture of geographical, political, and 
security-related preference-formations. From the perspective of multilateral diplomacy 
literature and negotiation theory therefore, UN disarmament politics is best characterised as 
an asymmetrical negotiation context,24 whereby the power symmetry of negotiations is 
balanced significantly in the favour of the P-5 who are ultimately responsible for deciding 
when, and how, they will relinquish their nuclear arsenals. As a consequence of the 
consensus rule within the UN’s main negotiation forums – the CD and the NPT, as well as 
with most decisions of import to multilateral progress within the First Committee - the P-5 
have been able to consistently present a conservative or status quo position, whereby they 
commit to the general objective of nuclear disarmament, but resist attempts by the UN to 
apply timetables, deadlines or binding imperatives.25  
 
This does not however mean that NNWS political groups seeking a more progressive 
negotiation agenda are without resources to pursue their objectives over the course of the 
UN’s disarmament negotiations. As negotiation theorists suggest, there are three main 
stages of multilateral negotiation including: (i) agenda-setting (ii) negotiation for formula 
and (iii) endgame bargaining.26  During the first phase stage, framing and argumentation 
may be employed in generating what Anatol Rapoport highlights as true debate, leading to 
consensus-building and collective action.27  Framing may, for example, be achieved through 
                                                 
23 Kingston Reif, ‘UN Disarmament Body Still Stalemated’, Arms Control Today, 2 September 2015 
24 Ole Elgström & M. Stromvik. ‘The European Union as an international negotiator’ in Elgström, O. & 
Jönsson, C. (eds.) European Union Negotiations: Processes, Networks and Institutions (London: Routledge, 
2005) p.121 
25 Interviews, May 2011; Interview, June 2015; Reaching Critical Will, The NPT Action Plan Monitoring 
Report 
26 Gunnar Sjöstedt, ‘Leadership in Multilateral Negotiations: Crisis or Transition’p.233 
27 See Smith & Laatikainen, ‘The Multilateral Politics of UN Diplomacy: Introduction’; Anatol Rapoport, 
Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960) 
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the depoliticising of a contentious issue, focusing on technical rather than political or 
strategic details, or broader normative objectives that are considered more acceptable for 
deliberation. Argumentation may also be employed in stressing that an agenda is motivated 
by friendly intentions, or spelling out the positive details of what certain objectives might 
achieve.28 A particular agenda may also be pushed by linking an objective with legal or 
scientific principles in an effort to raise the level of concern amongst more conservative 
negotiation partners in support of more progressive objectives.29 
 
More than this, during the negotiation for formula stage a party may undertake any number 
of tactics in an effort to enact change, even within an asymmetrical negotiation context.  For 
example, a party’s ability to come up with proposals that overcome differences is an 
important method by which a consensus-based agreement can be reached.  New policy 
solutions or technical language, submitted through working papers or in statements, are an 
important provision of policy-entrepreneurship, and are critical in both persuading others to 
adapt their positioning and in providing language that might be utilised in endgame texts.30 
More than this, as negotiation theory also indicates, in multilateral negotiations, coalitions 
are themselves considered important means of bringing the number of actors involved in 
negotiating often complex and politicised issues down to a more manageable number so that 
consensus can be more easily achieved.31 Where achieved moreover, coalitions within 
multilateral negotiations are seen as an important method of moving negotiations forward, 
or bringing them to a successful end.32 Within the context of the UN’s disarmament forums 
therefore groups or coalitions of states are critical to understanding not only the stalemate 
that has beset negotiations, but also the potential to overcome this stalemate moving 
forward. The next section considers how such new groups form and pursue their objectives. 
                                                 
28 Iklé, How Nations Negotiate p.197-2003 
29 Levy, M., Keohane, R. & P. Haas, ‘Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions’ 
in Haas, P., Keohane, R. & M. Levy (eds.) Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International 
Environmental Protection (MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 2001) p. 399 
30 Zartman, I.W. & Berman, M.R. The Practical Negotiator (Yale University, West Hanover, 1982), p.2; F.C. 
Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc. Publishers, 1964),  p.193 
31 Ole Elgström & Christian Jönsson, ‘Introduction’ in Elgström, O. & Jonssön, C. (eds.) European Union 
Negotiations: Processes, Networks and Institutions (London: Routledge, 2005) p.2; V. Rittberger, ‘Global 
Conference Diplomacy and International Policy-Making The Case of UN-sponsored World Conferences’ 
European Journal of Political Research 11(2), (1983), pp. 167-182, p. 177 
32 Gunnar Sjöstedt, ‘Leadership in Multilateral Negotiations: Crisis or Transition’ in Berton, P., Kimura, H., & 
Zartman, I.W. (eds.) International negotiation: Actors, Structure/Process, Values (Hampshire, Macmillan 
Press Ltd, 1999) p.242 
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New group dynamics in UN disarmament forums 
Since 2010 multilateral disarmament negotiations within the UN have experienced a 
fundamental shift.  The new decade began with a season of optimism for the global nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. In April 2010, the US published its Nuclear Posture Review 
setting out concrete steps to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons and to move towards 
‘global zero’.33 In May 2010 the NPT RevCon further ended with a widely lauded 64-Point 
Action Plan detailing deliberate steps forward across all three pillars of the Treaty, including 
in nuclear disarmament.34 However, multilateral stalemate soon set in,35 and this time with 
growing frustrations being voiced,36 as it became apparent that several of the P-5 were not 
only resisting steps to enact the NPT Action Plan agreed in May, but were in some cases 
modernising existing arsenals.37   
 
As a consequence of this resumption of stasis within the global non-proliferation regime, 
since 2010 a new dynamic has started to emerge centred upon a deliberate reframing of the 
nuclear debate away from the strategic and security-related discourses dominant since the 
Cold War, and onto humanitarian arguments for not only disarming, but outright banning, 
nuclear weapons.  Following the same framing logics that have been successfully employed 
in the banning of landmines, cluster munitions, biological and chemical weapons, and which 
have been legitimised by their focus upon international humanitarian law,38 this new 
humanitarian discourse has sought to energise beleaguered NNWS, refocus the policy 
debate, and subsequently inject renewed momentum into multilateral disarmament 
negotiations.39 
 
Of special interest is that this humanitarian discourse has largely resulted from the creation 
of a new political group active since 2010 both within the First Committee and the NPT’s 
2010-2015 review cycle.40 The Group of Sixteen was formed as an informal and ad hoc 
group of states parties and observers to the NPT shortly after the 2010 Action Plan was 
                                                 
33 United States Department of Defence, Nuclear Posture Review 2010, 2010 
34 UNODA, ‘Final Document – Volume I’ 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT 
(NPT/CONF/2010.50 (Vol. I)), 2010. 
35 Including further failures in the CD to adopt a programme of works in 2010  
36 Interviews, May-June 2011  
37 Reaching Critical Will, Assuring Destruction Forever: Nuclear Weapon Modernization Around the World, 
2012  
38 Interviews, June 2015; International Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, Catastrophic Humanitarian 
Harm, 2012, p.23 
39 Interviews, June 2015 
40 Interview, June 2015 
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introduced.  Within the 2010 RevCon outcome document, states parties noted their deep 
concern over ‘the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons’.41 
Recognising however, that more urgency was required to generate action towards nuclear 
disarmament by the 2015 NPT RevCon, and that a humanitarian consequences approach 
provided a comprehensive perspective from which to approach the problem, a new Group 
was formed. By the 2012 NPT PrepCom meeting in New York, the Group was presenting 
statements as the ‘States Parties focusing on the Humanitarian Dimension’, coordinated and 
led initially by Switzerland.42 From 2012 the ‘Informal Group of Sixteen’ began to 
undertake numerous proactive tactics to generate support for what had become widely 
known as the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’, including submitting working papers and hosting 
side-events at the NPT PrepComs in 2013 and 2014. Three of its members also hosted high-
profile international conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (HINW) 
in Nayarit, Mexico in 2012, Oslo, Norway in 2013, and Vienna, Austria in 2014. 
 
By the 2015 NPT RevCon the G16, backed by an impressive civil society campaign, had 
generated significant support for the Humanitarian Initiative, comprising a statement by 
Austria on behalf of 156 NPT states parties,43 and with growing numbers further signing or 
endorsing a ‘Humanitarian Pledge’.44 This Pledge sets out the commitment by states parties 
‘to present the facts-based discussions, findings and compelling evidence of the Vienna 
Conference…to all relevant fora...in the UN framework’; and explicitly calls on all states 
parties to the NPT to, ‘identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap for the 
prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons’.45  Whilst this campaign failed to achieve 
any timetable or agreed points of action at the 2015 NPT RevCon, the Humanitarian Pledge 
has nevertheless been considered the main outcome of that negotiation,46 and continues to 
                                                 
41 UNODA, ‘Final Document – Volume I’, p.19 
42 UNODA ‘Joint Statement on the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament by Austria, Chile, Costa 
Rica, Denmark, Holy See, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, South Africa, 
Switzerland’ Statement to the First Session of the PrepCom for the 2015 NPT RevCon, 2 May 2012 
43 UNODA ‘Joint Statement on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons’ 28 April 015 
44UNODA ‘The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and the Austrian Pledge’ 
(NPT/CONF.2015/WP.29), 2015;See also 
<http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Zentrale/Aussenpolitik/Abruestung/HINW14/HINW14vienna
_Pledge_Document.pdf> which, at time of writing, had received 121 signatures 
45 UNODA ‘The Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons and the Austrian 
Pledge’ 
46 Ray Acheson, ‘2015 NPT Review Conference outcome is the Humanitarian Pledge’ Reaching Critical Will, 
Negotiation Bulletin, 23 May 2015 
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remain high on the UN’s disarmament agenda, featuring particularly prominently in the UN 
First Committee’s 70th session from October-November 2015.47  
 
A second new group to have formed since 2010 is the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament 
Initiative. Like the G16 the NPDI came into being shortly after the 2010 NPT RevCon with 
the deliberate intention of furthering the 64-Point Action Plan that had been agreed.48 
Similar to the G16, the NPDI is an ad hoc group which has no formalised structure or 
secretariat. Coordination in both groups is conducted at senior official level and with each 
member state taking turns to represent collective group positions within the NPT’s review 
cycle PrepComs, RevCon and in First Committee sessions. Like Switzerland in the case of 
the G16, the NPDI was an initiative led by Australia and Japan who sought the formation of 
a small yet focused group of like-minded states who could ‘make a difference’ in the 
proactive, yet ‘pragmatic’ furtherance of the 2010 Action Plan.49 As with the selection of 
members that formed the G16, the NPDI’s membership was explicitly intended to be cross-
regional, including states of importance from regions around the world, and who were active 
both within the global nuclear disarmament debate and within other political groupings.50  
 
For the NPDI, whose aim has been to provide what is considered a necessary bridge-builder 
role within the UN’s disarmament forums51, and particularly the NPT, this includes various 
high-profile middle-ground States who have consistently adopted a pragmatic line in the 
nuclear disarmament debate such as Canada, Australia and Japan, as well, in many cases, as 
important regional players who themselves fall under a nuclear umbrella (for example as 
NATO members), and thus do not proactively seek the immediate abolition of nuclear 
weapons. In this way, such cross-regionalism, identifying key players to the debate but 
whose geographical location is also taken into consideration, has been seen to provide an 
important means of leverage for the NPDI, not least in being able to legitimately act in a 
mediatory role between the P-5 and the other established NNWS groups including the NAC 
and NAM.52 
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Like the G16, the NPDI also adopted a proactive role within the NPT’s 2010-2015 review 
cycle. It actively sought to contribute to the negotiations by building more cooperative 
relations with other groups and through the submission of carefully considered consensus-
based policy language that could enable progress.53 The NPDI further demonstrated an 
impressive level of coordination as a new political group,54 not only internally whereby it 
has been able to share information between its own members, but also in its external 
coordination with other political groups including the P5 and NAC.55 This outreach to other 
groups, conducted through both formal meetings, and informally through the diplomatic 
relationships of NPDI members, was intended to ensure closer cooperation with the more 
established blocs and a freer exchange of views.56  
 
As a result of this diplomatic coordination, the NPDI delivered numerous working papers to 
the NPT review negotiations, detailing consensus-based language, including proposals for 
taking forward action within the NPT. Prominent in this respect was one particular working 
paper which included a comprehensive and highly detailed summary of consensus-based 
language that might be adopted as final texts spanning all three of the NPT’s main pillars.57  
Recognised to reflect a middle-ground between the P-5 on the one hand, and the NAM and 
NAC on the other, this paper was subsequently reflected in the RevCon President’s own 
draft summary report58 and which continues to be drawn upon in reflections for how the 
NPT may move forward into its next review cycle.59 The significance of the NPDI was 
moreover made clear when three of its members, Japan, Australia, and the Netherlands, 
were invited to join the ‘small room’ group of key negotiators hosted by the NPT RevCon 
President in order to finalise a consensus on nuclear disarmament in the final week of 
negotiations.60 
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As this discussion has demonstrated, in both the cases of the G16 and NPDI, significant 
efforts have been exerted to re-energise the UN’s multilateral disarmament negotiations. For 
the G16 this has been apparent through their deliberate reframing of the nuclear debate to 
better account for the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.  Utilising framing and 
argumentation tactics the G16 have presented an impressive case for a more progressive 
agenda within the UN’s disarmament forums. Through reframing the debate in terms of the 
positive normative necessity of protecting human life, they have generated a significant 
body of support, not only amongst beleaguered NNWS who have lost faith that consensus-
based decision-making can achieve results in these forums, but also amongst civil society 
which has bolstered the legitimacy and potency of the Humanitarian Initiative moving 
forward.61 For the NPDI, tactics have in contrast been geared less to reframing the nuclear 
debate and more to acting in a mediatory capacity between the P-5, NAC and NAM to 
generate momentum and push forward with multilateral solutions to the issue of nuclear 
disarmament. This has especially involved cooperative information exchange and 
subsequent policy-entrepreneurship with the submission of working language providing 
building blocks for incremental change.  
 
In this way, both the G16 and NPDI have sought a path for progress and consensus within 
the UN’s disarmament forums.62 Reflecting again upon Rapoport’s analogy, in so doing 
these new group dynamics are indicative of efforts to overcome both the games of bloc-
formation, entrenchment, and the conservatism of the P-5 in living up to their nuclear 
disarmament obligations, and to focus instead upon facilitating debate amongst NWS and 
NNWS in order to move closer to a consensus and, in time, collective action from the UN’s 
disarmament forums.63 Whilst these efforts have, thus far, had little to show for themselves 
in terms of generating genuine action, they nevertheless suggest a glimmer of hope for UN 
disarmament politics. In the next section these positive signals and the influence that groups 
have had upon UN disarmament politics will be further developed.  
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The influence of groups in UN disarmament politics 
As the examples of the G16 and NPDI serve to highlight, groups within the UN’s 
disarmament forums have influenced multilateral disarmament negotiations in three 
different ways.  First, groups manage complexity by reducing the sheer number of voices, 
interests and perspectives at work within multilateral negotiations down to a more 
manageable number. This is particularly important within the NPT and First Committee 
where negotiations take place within a specified, and relatively tight, time-frame. As with 
the other established political groups at work in the UN’s disarmament forum, including the 
P-5, NAC, and NAM, the G16 and NPDI were formed as coalitions of like-minded states in 
order to collectively pursue a broadly common position.  By pursuing like-minded 
objectives through these groups, states have in turn been able to pool their (oftentimes 
scarce) resources and expertise whilst bolstering their own individual leverage.  As the 
reality of UN disarmament negotiations is of an increasingly group-dominated form of 
multilateralism, working within groups is becoming a necessity for any state seeking to 
exert an influence within the negotiation process, not only in the pursuit of their own 
national agenda, but also in broader terms of supporting a multilateral consensus-based 
solution to achieve nuclear disarmament.  
 
As the example of the G16 reveals, groups can also have a substantive influence through 
pooled social resources. In collaborating the member states of the G16 have become ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ capable of influencing debate through framing and argumentation, drawing 
upon wider normative principles – such as international humanitarian law – to enhance their 
legitimacy and to diffuse their group position to the wider NPT and First Committee 
communities. Closely related to this, groups influence UN multilateral disarmament 
negotiations courtesy of the enhanced diplomatic networks that they foster. As the example 
of the G16 and NPDI shows, members were deliberately sought out and invited to join not 
only based upon their geographical location, like-mindedness, and relative importance to the 
global nuclear disarmament debate, but also, in many cases, because those states also 
crucially aligned with other established political groups at work within the UN’s 
disarmament forums.64  
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As Figure 1 demonstrates, all of the political groups at work within UN disarmament forums 
are closely interlinked with several examples of cross-alignment by states active in multiple 
groups. The G16 thus includes a cross-factional membership including most of the members 
of the NAC (Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, New Zealand and Egypt), key players of the 
NAM (Algeria, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines), the EU (Ireland, Denmark 
and Austria), and the NPDI (Mexico).  The NPDI in turn comprises members of the EU 
(Germany, the Netherlands, and Poland) as well as the G16 (Mexico).  The NAC is also 
notable for its cross-factional membership, including Ireland (a member of the EU and 
G16), South Africa and Egypt (NAM and G16), New Zealand (G16), and Mexico (G16 and 
NPDI).  
 
Figure 1: Cross-alignment of major political groups within the NPT: 2010- 
 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
Such cross-factional group memberships can have challenges. The inclusion of Mexico in 
the NPDI, for example, has generated some difficulties for the group in presenting bridge-
building language that would appease Mexico (an ardent backer of a nuclear ban treaty), and 
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still be conducive to the P-5.65 The EU has also frequently struggled to maintain its own 
unity of action within the NPT due to the cross-alignment of many of its more vocal 
member states within other political groupings.66 However, the benefits of group cross-
alignments within UN disarmament forums are also profound. Groups are considered by 
their members as crucial forums for information-sharing. Regular coordination between 
group members thus not only ensures a freer exchange of views and the pooling of 
intelligence, but also helps to build personal relationships, and even trust, between 
negotiators.67  
 
When group members also align with other political groups, regular coordination further 
enables informal networks to be forged and closer intra-group exchanges fostered.  This is 
an important influencing factor of group interplay because, through the active 
encouragement of cooperative exchanges, negotiators on opposing sides of a negotiation 
issue are far more likely to generate some ‘zone of agreement’ leading to possible 
consensus.68 Such intra-group cooperative exchange was apparent in the 2015 NPT RevCon 
through the activities of the NPDI, although the impact of this exchange may only become 
evident in the longer term. It has moreover been seen as a function of the EU in previous 
RevCons: the EU acting as an intelligence-sharing hub for those member states involved in 
other political groups during the 2010 RevCon, enabling the EU to contribute consensus-
based language that formed part of the 2010 outcome document.69  As these examples 
suggest, whilst entrenched bloc positions and mistrust between negotiators can cause 
multilateral stalemate, cross-alignment of groups and more open diplomatic networks for 
information-exchange could be equally as important in overcoming it. 
 
Finally, returning to the three stages of multilateral negotiation highlighted earlier, as this 
article has reflected, groups are found to have an influence within the UN’s disarmament 
forums through the role that they play particularly during the agenda-setting and negotiation 
for formula stages. The work of the G16, for example, has fundamentally altered the agenda 
of the UN’s disarmament forum since 2010.  The increased focus on the humanitarian 
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consequences of nuclear weapons as a specific discourse within the NPT and First 
Committee can be seen as a direct consequence of this group’s formation and activities in 
garnering support for the Humanitarian Initiative. The NPDI has moreover demonstrated an 
important influence over the negotiation for formula phase of the NPT’s 2015 review 
negotiations through its efforts in policy-entrepreneurship; coming up with consensus-based 
middle-ground language that was then taken forward in the President’s draft summary 
report. In this way, groups, and new groups especially, are starting to make a purposeful 
difference to the processes involved within the UN’s disarmament forums.   
 
What remains to be seen is the extent to which groups can make a direct influence upon 
endgame bargaining and thus the subsequent outcome of UN disarmament negotiations. The 
fact that the 2015 NPT RevCon failed to achieve a consensus-based final document, despite 
the efforts exerted by the G-16, NPDI and other group players such as P-5, NAC and NAM, 
would suggest limits to the influence that political groups can have within such a difficult 
negotiation environment.  The ongoing stalemate of UN disarmament negotiations is not 
easily overcome, even with new group dynamics coming to the fore.  And yet, the fact that it 
was key members of the P-5, NAC, NPDI and G-16 that came together in the final week of 
the 2015 NPT RevCon to seek agreement on draft texts is suggestive of groups having an 
important role to play in endgame bargaining. Whilst it is understood that states involved in 
such ‘small room’ endgame discussions do participate in their national capacity, it is also 
crucially their group participation that enables them to feed back to a wider membership, 
build consensus, and in turn ensure support for any negotiated outcome agreement. Time 
will therefore tell if these new group dynamics can make a difference in this way and, in 
turn, overcome the multilateral stalemate of UN disarmament forums. 
Conclusion 
In this article, group dynamics within the UN’s disarmament forums have been considered. 
Two research questions are at its heart: first, how do states explicitly interact through groups 
in UN disarmament forums; and second, what difference do these group dynamics and 
interplay make to consensus-building? Focusing on the first research question, it has been 
shown that states are understood to interact within political groups within UN disarmament 
forums for the purposes of pooling knowledge and resources whilst further enhancing their 
leverage, legitimacy, and bargaining strength relative to other group players. As the example 
of the new G16 and NPDI groups reflect, memberships of political groups in disarmament 
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forums is a careful calculation; taking into consideration not only like-mindedness, but 
importance of the state in the nuclear disarmament debate, geographical spread, and, 
importantly, the alignment of that state within other political groupings.  
 
This, in turn, is important for understanding the difference that group dynamics and 
interplay make to consensus-building within disarmament negotiations. This article finds 
that the influence of group dynamics within the UN’s disarmament forums is evident in 
three clear ways.  First, the formation of political groups within UN disarmament forums 
manages the complexity of negotiations by reducing the number of interests, preferences 
and voices down to a more manageable number, thus enabling negotiators to concentrate on 
selected priority issues and to engage with others within the timeframe permitted to them. 
Second, the group dynamics at play within these forums, and particularly within the NPT, 
has since 2010 been notably more influential in fostering cooperative intra-group exchanges. 
By drawing upon the cross-alignment of their members with other political groupings and 
by acting as hubs for intelligence sharing, new groups have reflected an important means of 
consensus-building which could lead to improved diplomatic networks between entrenched 
group positions moving forward.  
 
Finally, groups are influencing consensus-building within the UN’s disarmament forums 
particularly through the agenda-setting and negotiation for formula stages of multilateral 
negotiation. As the new group dynamics of the G16 and NPDI represent, political groups 
and their interplay can make a substantive difference both to the underlying discourse and 
agenda of multilateral disarmament negotiations, and the processes by which consensus-
based policy language can be formulated and taken through to decision-making. What will 
be revealing, and a topic ripe for future research, is how these groups will continue to not 
only shape negotiation processes, but in fact impact outcome through endgame bargaining. 
Whilst evidence would suggest that we cannot overstate this influence to date, the new 
group dynamics now at play are indicative of groups taking on an increasingly prominent 
and shaping role, not only in overcoming the entrenchment of more established blocs within 
the UN’s disarmament forums, but, in time, of delivering consensus-based, negotiated 
outcome agreements that may pave the way to progress for the UN. 
 
